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Abstract—We outline a contact-tracing strategy based on
proximity sensing using mobile devices. We discuss what an
ideal system should look like and what it can do. We show
that, when adopted sufficiently broadly, such a contact-tracing
strategy can bring COVID-19 under complete control, end
the need of social distancing, and return the society to full
normalcy. We also review some of the challenges faced by the
current generation of proximity-sensing technologies, including
Bluetooth Low Energy used by phones, and consider both
interim and longer-term solutions. Our main contribution is
that we reason through why such a contact-tracing strategy is
likely to achieve the stated goal of returning to full normalcy.
Using probabilistic models, we show that universal adoption is
not necessary to achieve the stated goal, thus there is some room
for exceptions; however, the adoption rate needs to be very
high, e.g., above 95% depending on the disease parameters.
With more vigilance in disease surveillance to detect mild cases
earlier, the number may be brought down to about 90%. The
results call for deployment effort to be led by public authorities
at the state or federal level so that the required adoption rate
can be reached and the tracing coverage is wide enough to be
relevant for disease control.
Keywords-Contact Tracing, COVID-19, Proximity Sensing,
Bluetooth Low Energy
I. INTRODUCTION
The motivating question we ask here is what comes next
after the strong suppression measures of COVID-19 succeed.
Imagine that the suppression measures have worked so well
in a country or a major city that only a small number of cases
are reported daily. Can people return to the kind of life and
work they had before the outbreak of COVID-19? Unless
herd immunity has been achieved or a curative treatment
has been discovered, the answer is likely no because a few
cases a day will start a new cycle of exponential increase,
turning into thousands of cases a day in a matter of weeks
or months. The current proposals for economic reopening
all include ubiquitous social distancing. As long as social
distancing is in place, there is no normalcy. To return to
genuine normalcy and sustain it, people must feel the risk of
infection is low and it must remain that way indefinitely. In
other words, the state of having a low number of infections
in the population must be a steady one rather than merely
the beginning stage of an exponential growth.
To achieve that steady state, we envision a technology-
based contact-tracing strategy that makes contact tracing
more rapid, more accurate, more comprehensive and less
labor-intensive. We will argue that if it is adopted sufficiently
widely and if the infected individuals discovered through
tracing are quarantined (which requires widespread testing
and solid quarantine measures), the number of infections can
be kept very low indefinitely, allowing the society to return
to its normal functioning.
The key of this contact-tracing strategy is a mobile device
that all or a majority of the people shall carry most of the
time when they go to work, shops, or other public places.
Let’s call this device a contact recorder. Its main function
is to detect the presence of other individuals who also carry
contact recorders in the vicinity, say within 2 meters, and
record those device IDs, the distance, and the duration of
contact at the distance. Once an infected person, say A,
is identified by testing, the recorded contact information
is used to find all the people that A might have infected
through close contact. The contact information can also help
to identify who might have infected A, even if that person
is asymptomatic.
To do that, the contact recorder needs to be equipped
with hardware capable of short-range distance sensing, also
known as proximity sensing. Most of the newer phones
have a form of such proximity sensing capability based
on Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) – by measuring the re-
ceived signal strength. The required proximity sensing is not
something the GPS system can alone provide. Although the
GPS trajectory data have some usefulness for the intended
application (see later), they are not accurate enough for
detection of short-range contacts.
It is important to emphasize that the benefit of the
proposed strategy is not just that a person who carries the
device will be notified quickly if he/she was in contact with
an infected individual. Its main benefit, when deployed and
used broadly enough, is to ensure that the risk of infection
for everyone is low to start with, so that people don’t have
worries about resuming their normal life.
In this paper, we outline the above described contact-
tracing strategy. We discuss what an ideal system should
look like and what it can do. We also review some of the
challenges faced by the current generation of proximity-
sensing technologies. In the interest of timely deployment
to cope with the current crisis, the contact recorder can be
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initially implemented as an app on a smart watch or a mobile
phone. In the long run, the challenges should be dealt with
more carefully and the device may need to be designed
from ground up in anticipation of the next pandemic. We
also speculate why such a contact-tracing strategy can be
accepted widely, wider than what first impression may
suggest.
One of our main contributions is that we reason through
why such a contact-tracing strategy is likely to achieve the
goal of returning to full normalcy. One of our main messages
is that the potential of such contact tracing is huge: It can
stop the spread of the disease and keep it that way without
social distancing. Another main message is that universal
adoption is not necessary to achieve the stated goal, thus
there is some room for exceptions; however, the adoption
rate needs to be very high, e.g., above 95% depending
on the disease parameters. With more vigilance in disease
surveillance to detect mild cases earlier, the number may be
brought down to about 90%. The results call for deployment
effort to be led by public authorities at the state or federal
level so that the required adoption rate can be reached and
the tracing coverage is wide enough to be relevant for disease
control.
As of April 2020, we are seeing an increasing number
of proposed or actual contact-tracing systems based on
proximity sensing [1]–[4]. Singapore has deployed a phone-
based system, called TraceTogether [1], which contains a
subset of the features outlined in this paper. The contact
data of an individual is stored in his/her phone. Once the
individual is confirmed to be infected, he/she can choose
to allow the government server to access the data in the
phone app, which helps identify close contacts. Apple and
Google have made announcement that they will launch a
comprehensive solution at the level of application program-
ming interfaces (APIs) and operating systems to assist in
enabling contact tracing using apps developed by third-
party developers and/or public health authorities [2]. User
privacy features strongly in their solution. For instance,
explicit user consent is required to use the contact data,
personally identifiable information or user location data will
not be collected, and the list of contacted people never
leaves a user’s phone. European research institutions and
governments are behind the proposals in [3], [4], which also
have strong privacy-protection components. In particular, [3]
takes a decentralized approach to privacy-preserving tracing.
We feel that these proposals have not focused enough
on the full potential of such contact-tracing systems. They
exhibit a somewhat laissez-faire philosophy for adoption
and use of such systems. First, for perfectly understandable
reasons of not looking draconian, the advocacy for adoption
is drastically toned down with messages such as ‘people
should pass words around and opt in’. Second, the contact
information is only made available incrementally. When
tracing reaches an individual, a request is sent and contact
information becomes available after the individual’s consent
[1]. We make stronger claims here and we attempt to
substantiate them. The contact-tracing strategy based on
proximity sensing can keep the disease fully contained
without the need of other mitigation measures such as social
distancing or universal mask-wearing. It is not just a nice
thing to have that complements other measures; it can end
social distancing and allow the society to return to full
normalcy. However, in order to achieve that, the adoption
rate needs to be very high. We show that the ability to trace
an entire cluster of infections is important, rather than just
a subset of the individuals on best-effort basis. For that, it
is crucial that the contact information from all individuals
in the cluster is available, and preferably in real time to
minimize the response time. Other proposals that use more
laid-back approaches do not allow easy tracing of an entire
cluster.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the main idea of the contact-tracing
strategy. In Section III, we answer why the strategy will
achieve the stated goal. A highlight is that we analyze the
minimum adoption rate required for the strategy to work as
intended. In Section IV, we discuss the device requirements,
and the interim and long-term solutions. The conclusion and
additional discussions are given in Section V.
II. THE MAIN IDEA OF THE STRATEGY
A. Why Fast and Comprehensive Contact Tracing is Crucial
The experiences of South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong,
and Taiwan have provided evidence that it is possible to
keep the number of COVID-19 cases at a low level for a
long period of time through aggressive testing, relentless
contact tracing and high-quality quarantine. The reason these
measures work is that together they can reduce the repro-
duction ratio, which is the average number of individuals
directly infected by one patient. The reproduction ratio is
a key parameter governing the dynamics of the number of
infected cases. When the reproduction ratio is greater than
1, with a very high chance, the number of infections grows
exponentially fast. Clearly, the smaller the reproduction
ratio, the slower the number of infections grows. If the
ratio is reduced to below 1, the exponential growth will
not happen and the number of infections will collapse until
it reaches zero. For COVID-19, earlier estimates put the
basic reproduction ratio, usually denoted by Ro, in the range
between 3 to 4. One recent estimate put it as high as 5.7 [5].
It is not clear whether the measures taken by aforementioned
Asian regions have reduced it to a number below 1 or just
slightly above 1.
In a perfect world where the three measures work per-
fectly and without delay, any infected individual will be
immediately isolated from the general population (the re-
production ratio will be zero). Realistically, they each have
some challenges. Among the three measures, how to im-
prove the testing capability and speed has attracted a great
deal of effort and it is expected that testing will soon not
be a bottleneck. It is also hopeful that countries and regions
will eventually see the value of and institute solid quarantine
processes.1 Contact tracing remains a problem, as traditional
contact tracing requires boots on the ground, and therefore,
is labor-intensive and suffers long delay. Importantly, it
suffers a more difficult, inherent traceability challenge. A
patient may be unable to recall all the contacts he/she made,
and anonymous contacts in public places are not traceable.
Once community-based infection becomes serious enough,
societies often abandon contact tracing altogether.
We argue that the difficulties in contact tracing can be
largely resolved by using technologies. In other words,
contact tracing can be made more rapid, more accurate,
more comprehensive and less labor-intensive. Together with
widespread rapid testing and proper quarantine, nearly all
infected persons can be quickly isolated from the general
population. In other words, such contact tracing approxi-
mates what can be done in a perfect world, and therefore,
the society can be brought back to normal.
B. Tracing by Contact Recorder
The most important piece of this contact-tracing strategy
is the mobile device, the contact recorder, that everyone
carries in the public. Think about a smart watch or a mobile
phone. Each such device has a unique ID. On a central
server, the device ID is tied to the individual’s identity and
how the individual can be reached, such as a cell phone
number or an email address.
When two individuals are within a distance where virus
transmission is possible, say 2 meters, the devices are able
to detect each other and they each record the other device
ID, the distance, and the duration of contact at the distance.
The data is communicated to the central server, preferably
in real time.
Suppose an individual, say person A, is sick, tested and
confirmed to be infected. The central server checks the
contact information recorded on A’s device and conducts
risk evaluations of A’s recent contacts, say going back 14
days, and informs all those who are at risk of being infected
by A through contact. Depending on the risk level, some
of the at-risk individuals may be tested and/or quarantined;
others may only receive a notification of caution. The risk
evaluation may be based on the distance of contact, the
duration of contact, and how infectious person A is estimated
to be at the time of contact.
In addition to downstream tracing of those who might
be infected by person A, the contact information of A
can also be used for upstream tracing, i.e., finding out
1If the proposed contact-tracing strategy works as intended in keeping the
number of infections low, the required testing and quarantine capabilities
will be more easily satisfied.
who might have infected A through contact with A. By
repeated use of downstream and upstream tracing, a cluster
of infections with the same recent origin can be identified.
Another important use of upstream tracing is to identify and
isolate asymptomatic or presymptomatic cases. There has
been increasingly evidence that asymptomatic or presymp-
tomatic patients can infect other people. As long as such an
individual causes a serious symptomatic infection down the
line, he/she can be discovered by tracing upward from the
symptomatic individual.
Consider an example, which is shown in Fig. 1. Suppose
person A, who is asymptomatic, infected person A1 on day
1 and A2 on day 4. Suppose A1 went on to infect person
B1 on day 4 and B2 on day 5. Suppose B1 infected person
C1 on day 8. On day 9, person A1 was sick enough to seek
medical attention and was tested positive. Based on A1’s
contact history and by testing, it is possible to confirm A,
B1 and B2 as being positive. Therefore, the asymptomatic
patient A can be discovered. By tracing through B1’s contact
history, it is possible to discover C1. By tracing through A’s
contact history, it is possible to discover A2. The whole
cluster of patients originated from A will be all accounted
for. Note that the cluster can be represented as a directed
graph – in fact, a tree – where each node represents an
individual and an edge represents infection by contact. Let
us call it the infection tree.
A1
A
A2
B1
B2
C1
Day1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Figure 1. Infection tree – a cluster of infections started by patient A. A1
was the first one tested and confirmed on day 9.
From our description of the infection events, A can be
recognized as being upstream to A1 with respect to the
path of infection. However, during actual tracing, from A1’s
contact history alone, it is not immediately clear whether A
infected A1 or the other way around. More generally, the
graph constructed from the contact information of all the
involved individuals will initially look different from the
underlying infection tree. It may have more nodes, which
corresponds to contacted individuals who are not infected;
the direction of the edges remain to be determined; and
there may be even loops in the graph. Such a graph needs
to be processed to infer the infection tree. Doing so will
require not only contact information but also testing results
to prune non-patients and auxiliary information such as how
the disease progresses. In this paper, we will not dwell on the
inference problem. When we mention a cluster of infections
started by a patient A, we mean the infection tree rooted at
A.
C. Why Would Anyone Want to Use Such a Device?
The primary justification for carrying a contact recorder is
that it is an urgent public health measure in a crisis. There
need to be promises from the authority that the measure
is temporary, that its use is strictly limited to infectious
disease control, and that citizens’ privacy and data security
are properly guarded. The use of clever privacy-preservation
techniques will further alleviate worries that people may
have about privacy invasion. Beyond those, there are actually
incentives that may nudge citizens into using the device. The
following are notable ones.
• Price to pay to return to normal life: We will show
in Section III, with the help of contact recorders, the
number of infections can be consistently kept at a
very low level so that the society can return to its
normal functioning. People can go to work, restaurants,
and conduct all their daily business as usual, with the
comfort of knowing that the chance of infection is
small. The small inconvenience of carrying the device
can be viewed as the price to pay for returning to
normal life.
• Personal benefits: The individual will benefit from
getting notified very quickly should he/she be in contact
with an infected person, which allows timely testing,
proper quarantine (so that the individual’s family is pro-
tected) and early medical care for improved outcome.
• Civic duty: Carrying the device can be viewed as ful-
filling a civic duty required by public health measures.
It can be compared to getting the required vaccines
or complying with orders such as stay-at-home, social
distancing, or closure of business operations or other
activities. An individual who carries the device (let us
call such an individual an adopter) helps everyone else
while helping him/herself.
• Social expectation: People may be more willing to
interact with an adopter because he/she can rightfully
be perceived as being ‘less dangerous’ than a non-
adopter. If an adopter were in fact infectious, there
would have been ample pathways in the tracing that
lead to him/her. The fact that he/she is not isolated gives
credence that he/she has not been infected. Nothing like
that can be said about a non-adopter. Once the practice
of carrying the device is adopted widely enough, it may
become a social norm.
III. WHY WILL THE STRATEGY WORK?
A. Complete Traceability under Universal Adoption
In this section, we will show that, under the assumption of
universal adoption, the proposed contact-tracing strategy has
the property of complete traceability, which the traditional
manual method of tracing lacks. That is, assuming everyone
carries a device, all consequential infections through person-
to-person contact are traceable.
We will first examine the problems of manual tracing
in more details. We have already seen that, in addition
to costing excessive effort and resources, there is a recall
problem that afflicts manual tracing, i.e., a patient cannot
recall all the contacts he/she made, especially those in public
venues. There is a related problem, which we will call
the manifestation problem: If an infected individual does
not show any symptoms or shows only mild symptoms,
he/she may not seek medical care to be tested. In principle,
recall is not needed if there is no manifestation problem;
every patient will show enough symptoms and will be
tested. On the other hand, if there is perfect recall, the
manifestation problem will go away because in a growing
cluster of infections someone will show enough symptoms
to be tested and everyone in the cluster will be recalled,
including patients with no or mild symptoms.
In practice, the manifestation problem exists and recall
is imperfect, and together, they pose severe challenges to
manual tracing. For COVID-19, it is difficult to know
precisely what percentage of the infected individuals are
asymptomatic (or presymptomatic). Iceland tested a portion
of its population and found 50% of those who tested positive
showed no symptoms [6]. Other reports vary greatly, putting
the percentage as low as less than 10% and as high as
more than 90%. Much may have to do with confusing
the presymptomatic cases with true asymptotic cases [7].
Among the symptomatic patients, it has been estimated that
between 10% − 20% of them are severe enough to require
hospitalization. With the combined effects of asymptomatic,
presymptomatic and mild cases, a cluster may grow to a size
between one dozen to even one hundred infected individuals
before one of them seeks medical attention. By then, the
cluster of infected would have been in contact with a large
number of people who end up not being infected, making
the task of recall even more challenging. For tracing to work
perfectly, the recall needs to be enough to include all the
contacts that have led to infection, which is often impossible
without the help of contact recorders. Consequently, manual
tracing often misses many patients in a cluster, especially
those asymptomatic or mild cases, as is well documented.
When tracing is done with contact recorders, both the
recall and manifestation problems can be completely dealt
with. We have already seen that the contact recorder solves
the recall problem. With the recall problem solved, an entire
cluster can be discovered as long as one patient in the cluster
is tested positive. Then, what guarantees that some patient
in the cluster gets tested in the first place? It is well known
that, in the absence of any intervention, the cluster size will
either stop growing or grow to infinity exponentially fast.2
If a cluster grows to infinity, it will eventually include an
individual with severe enough symptoms to be caught and
tested by the medical system, at which point the whole
cluster will be discovered. What we mean by complete
traceability is that all growing clusters are eventually fully
discovered. A cluster that eventually stops growing by itself
will stop contributing to the spread of the disease, and hence,
can be ignored from the current discussion.
Although all growing clusters are eventually discovered
with the proposed tracing strategy, the delay in discovering
a cluster and the cluster size at the time of discovery depend
on many details in the tracing process, the random infection
process and how the disease progresses, as shown in the
example of Fig. 1. Since shorter delay and a smaller cluster
size clearly have practical benefits, countries should try
to make rapid testing abundantly available and the public
should be informed to seek testing as soon as symptoms
show up. In some countries, effort was made to catch
patients with mild symptoms, mainly by checking body
temperature broadly in public places such as schools.
One of the key points is that, in order to discover an
entire cluster of infections, the contact information from all
individuals in the cluster is needed. For the most timely
disease surveillance and prevention of its spread, all such
contact information should be available at soon as a pa-
tient is confirmed. This suggests that, from the purpose of
minimizing the disease spread, the best arrangement is to
make all contact information available in real time, so that
the process for discovering the entire cluster can take place
immediately. In contrast, it is less than optimal if the contact
information is requested one by one on a need basis as the
tracing process progresses, which is the method of other
tracing systems/proposals [1], [2].
A related key point is that what makes such tracing
method powerful is the ability to discover an entire cluster,
not just some members of the cluster. Under the assumption
of universal adoption, there is no reason to discover anything
less than the whole cluster. More fundamentally, it is the
manifestation problem that leads to the need to trace an en-
tire cluster because patients with mild or no symptoms may
only be discoverable through their connections with other
patients in the cluster who have more severe symptoms.
There is another view about the effectiveness of such
tracing method, which is based on a consideration of the
reproduction ratio. Once an infected person is identified, by
downstream tracing, all the persons he/she infected can be
immediately isolated from the general population. Thus, for
2Before the population is largely immune, the time dynamic of a cluster
size can be studied under the framework of branching processes. When the
mean number of offsprings is greater than 1, a branching process either
goes extinct or goes to infinity at an exponential rate (see page 316 in [8]).
all symptomatic cases, the reproduction ratio can effectively
be reduced to zero. Asymptomatic patients can be identified
by upstream tracing and testing. Then, by downstream
tracing, the reproduction ratio for asymptomatic patients can
also be reduced to zero. In Section III-B, we will use this
view to argue for the effectiveness of the tracing method
when the device adoption is not universal.
B. Is Universal Adoption Necessary?
In Section III-A, we argued that, under the assumption
of universal adoption (i.e., that everyone carries a con-
tact recorder), the proposed contact-tracing strategy will be
completely effective in that it will be able to catch all
growing clusters of infections. Since universal adoption is
difficult to achieve and may be deemed draconian, we ask the
natural question whether the strategy can remain effective if
certain percentage of people are opt out, and if so, what
that percentage is. Here, effectiveness is with respect to the
original goal of keeping the number of infections low on
a consistent basis. The quick answer is: Universal adoption
is not necessary; however, to achieve the stated goal, the
adoption rate needs to be very high. We will argue this
formally. The often-used notations are summarized in Table
I.
Table I
OFTEN-USED NOTATIONS
R0 basic reproduction ratio
  = 1/R0
Re effective reproduction ratio with tracing and quarantine
N a random variable representing the number of
direct infections by a patient
A,Ai patient A infects individuals A1, . . . , AN
χ effective number of direct infections caused by a patient
Xi contribution (0 or 1) to χ by Ai, and χ =
∑N
i=1Xi
pi0 probability that a cluster eventually stops growing
under the condition of no mitigation measures
pi1 1− pi0, the probability that a cluster grows to infinity
p adoption rate
p∗ minimum required adoption rate such that Re < 1
ν probability that a patient shows severe symptoms
µk probability that at least one patient shows severe
symptoms in a cluster of size k
EC(Ai) eventual size of the cluster started by patient Ai
when there is no tracing
Y the random variable representing the cluster size
when the first patient is tested
First, it is clear that the more people who carry contact
recorders, the more effective the contact-tracing strategy is
in curbing the spread of the virus. However, it may be
the case that, at a certain adoption rate of the device, the
tracing strategy can slow down the growth of the number
of infections, but it is still an exponential growth, just a
slow one. If the goal is to maintain a very low number
of infections as a steady state, the effective reproduction
ratio needs to be kept below 1. We will show that there
is a cutoff value with respect to the required adoption rate.
Below the cutoff value, the corresponding reproduction ratio
is larger than 1; above it, the corresponding reproduction
ratio is less than 1, in which case the number of infections
will eventually go to zero.
Suppose the adoption rate is denoted by p, which is the
fraction of the population with contact recorders. Consider
an arbitrary infected person A. Suppose A goes on to
directly infect N other individuals, A1, . . . , AN , where N
is a random variable. The expectation of N is equal to R0,
where R0 is the basic reproduction ratio. Under the proposed
tracing strategy, we will define the effective reproduction
ratio of A, denoted by Re, which is equal to the expectation
of χ, the effective number of individuals directly infected by
A. In general, χ will not be equal to N . If the cluster of
infections started by Ai can be fully discovered by tracing
at some future time, the whole cluster, including Ai, will
be isolated from the general population; in that case, Ai
does not contribute to χ. The point is that, although A has
infected Ai, the effect of Ai is entirely removed at some
future time due to tracing and quarantine. It is as if Ai does
not exist when considering the spread of the disease.
More specifically, if N = 0, we let χ = 0. Next, suppose
N ≥ 1. Let Xi denote the contribution to χ by each Ai,
and let χ =
∑N
i=1Xi. We let Xi = 0 if the cluster started
by Ai is fully traced (and removed) at some later time; we
let Xi = 1, otherwise.
The Xi’s are IID, and they are independent of N . We then
have Re = E[χ] = E[N ]E[Xi] = R0E[Xi] = R0P (Xi =
1). We wish to have Re < 1 so that the spread of the disease
will eventually stop.
Let pi0 be the probability that the cluster started by Ai
eventually stops growing under the assumption that there are
no mitigation measures of any sort; let pi1 be the probability
that the cluster grows to infinity under the same assumption.
We have pi0 + pi1 = 1. For notational convenience, let  =
1/R0. The following theorem implies that our objective is
achievable even without universal adoption.
Theorem 1: Suppose pi1 > 1 − . There exists po < 1
such that for all p > po, the effective reproduction ratio Re
is less than 1.
Proof: Suppose N ≥ 1 and A infected individuals Ai,
where i = 1, . . . , N . Recall that Xi = 0 if the cluster started
by Ai is fully traceable at some point. That happens if and
only if (1) the cluster reaches some size k, (2) at least one
patient in the cluster has caught the attention of the medical
system and has been tested, and (3) everyone in the cluster
has a contact recorder so that the whole cluster can be traced.
Let EC(Ai) denote the eventual size of the cluster started
by Ai if it is unimpeded; that is, if there is no tracing and
quarantine. EC(Ai) can take a value from [1,∞]. Let Y be
the random variable representing the cluster size when the
first patient is tested. It is reasonable to think that, as long as
the cluster grows indefinitely, some patient will eventually be
tested. Therefore, we assume that, conditional on the cluster
size grows to infinity, P (Y < ∞) = 1. We then have the
following.
P (Xi = 0)
=
∞∑
k=1
P{EC(Ai) = k and Y ≤ k and everyone
in the cluster of size Y has a contact recorder}
+
∞∑
k=1
P{EC(Ai) =∞ and Y = k and everyone
in the cluster of size k has a contact recorder} (1)
≥
∞∑
k=1
P{EC(Ai) =∞ and Y = k and everyone
in the cluster of size k has a contact recorder}
=
∞∑
k=1
pkP{EC(Ai) =∞}P{Y = k|EC(Ai) =∞} (2)
=pi1
∞∑
k=1
pkP{Y = k|EC(Ai) =∞}. (3)
Now, by the monotone convergence theorem,∑∞
k=1 p
kP{Y = k|EC(Ai) = ∞} →
∑∞
k=1 P{Y =
k|EC(Ai) = ∞} = 1 as p → 1. Therefore, for any
δ > 0, there exists po < 1 such that for all p > po,
P (Xi = 0) > pi1(1− δ).
Now choose δ such that pi1(1 − δ) ≥ 1 −  and choose
the corresponding po. We then have P (Xi = 0) > 1−  and
therefore Re = R0P (Xi = 1) < 1 for all p > po.
Theorem 1 implies that, the contact-tracing strategy can
still achieve its goal of stopping the spread of the disease if
some people, up to a certain fraction of the population, are
opt out or otherwise unable to participate. Another implica-
tion is that if everyone participates but people occasionally
do not carry the contact recorder on some of their outings
– again up to a certain threshold – the tracing strategy will
still work. In particular, exceptions can be made for some
individuals or some occasions for which privacy protection
is needed at the highest level, as long as they are made rarely
(which we will discuss later).
For the parameter values of interest, pi1 is expected to be
very close to 1, and the condition of Theorem 1 is easily
satisfied. As an example, suppose the number of individuals
directly infected by a patient is a random variable with a
Poisson distribution of mean R0. It can be shown that pi0
is the solution of the equation log pi0 = R0(pi0 − 1) with a
value less than 1 (see page 226 of [8]).3 Table II shows the
values of pi0 and pi1 for R0 = 3, 4, 5, and 6, which will be
used later. We also see that pi1 is substantially greater than
1−  for these cases that are relevant to COVID-19.
In the Poisson case, the condition of Theorem 1 is always
satisfied due to the following result.
3Throughout, log denotes the natural log.
Table II
pi0 AND pi1 UNDER POISSON DISTRIBUTION
R0 pi0 pi1 1− 
3 0.0595 0.9405 0.6667
4 0.0198 0.9802 0.75
5 0.0070 0.9930 0.8
6 0.0025 0.9975 0.8333
Lemma 2: Suppose the number of direct infections
caused by a patient follows a Poisson distribution with mean
R0. Then, pi0 <  and pi1 > 1− .
Proof: As we have always assumed, R0 > 1 so that
0 <  < 1. We know that pi0 < 1 and it satisfies log pi0 =
R0(pi0−1). Consider the function f(x) = log x−R0(x−1).
We have f(1) = 0, and f(x)→ −∞ as x ↓ 0. Now, f ′(x) =
1/x−R0. Therefore, f(x) increases on (0, ) and decreases
on (, 1]. Moreover, f(x) achieves the maximum on (0, 1]
at x =  and the maximum value is greater than 0. Hence,
there is exactly one solution to f(x) = 0 on the interval
(0, 1) and it lies on (0, ). This solution is the required pi0.
C. Lower and Upper Bounds for Minimum Adoption Rate
The next natural question is: How high need the adoption
rate be in order to achieve the objective of stopping the
spread of the disease? We will show that a very high
adoption rate is needed, e.g., larger than 95%. Therefore,
although there is some wiggle room that allows some people
or some situations to be exempted, an appropriate public
health message should encourage everyone to almost always
carry the contact recorder when in public except on rare
occasions when privacy is a must.
Let p∗ denote the minimum required adoption rate such
that Re < 1, i.e., the smallest po for Theorem 1. We
will show our answer to the question by calculating a
lower bound and an upper bound for the minimum required
adoption rate p∗. It turns out the two bounds are extremely
close, and therefore, they are both good estimates of p∗.
The analysis requires a bit more assumptions than what
is needed for Theorem 1. Let ν be the probability that an
infected person shows severe enough symptoms to be picked
up by the medical system, where 0 < ν < 1. Let us assume
that the patients are IID with respect to showing severe
enough symptoms. When the size of a cluster of infected
patients is equal to k, let µk denote the probability that
at least one patient shows severe enough symptoms (who
will be tested). Then, by the definition of ν and the IID
assumption,
µk = 1− (1− ν)k. (4)
1) Lower Bound: We will start from (1). The second term
on the right hand side (1) can be written as the right hand
side of (3). Conditional on that the cluster size grows to in-
finity when unimpeded, we have P (Y = k) = (1− ν)k−1ν.
Continuing from (3), we get
pi1
∞∑
k=1
pkP{Y = k|EC(Ai) =∞}
= pi1
∞∑
k=1
pk(1− ν)k−1ν
= pi1
νp
1− p(1− ν) . (5)
We next work on the first term on the right hand side of
(1), which can be written as
∞∑
k=1
P{EC(Ai) = k and Y ≤ k and everyone
in the cluster of size Y has a contact recorder}
=
∞∑
k=1
k∑
j=1
pjP{EC(Ai) = k, Y = j}
=
∞∑
k=1
k∑
j=1
pjP{EC(Ai) = k}P{Y = j|EC(Ai) = k}
=
∞∑
k=1
k∑
j=1
pjP{EC(Ai) = k} (1− ν)
j−1ν
µk
=
∞∑
k=1
1− (p(1− ν))k
1− (1− ν)k P{EC(Ai) = k}
νp
1− p(1− ν) .
(6)
Lemma 3: For k ≥ 1, 1−(p(1−ν))k
1−(1−ν)k is decreasing in k.
It is maximized at k = 1 and the maximum is equal to
(1− p(1− ν))/ν.
Proof: We will tentatively view k as a real-valued
variable and take the derivative with respect to k.(1− (p(1− ν))k
1− (1− ν)k
)′
=
−pk(1− ν)k(1− (1− ν)k) log(p(1− ν))
(1− (1− ν)k)2
+
(1− pk(1− ν)k)(1− ν)k log(1− ν)
(1− (1− ν)k)2 . (7)
To show the above derivative is less than 0 for k ≥ 1, it is
enough to show
− pk(1− (1− ν)k) log(p(1− ν))
+ (1− pk(1− ν)k) log(1− ν) < 0,
which simplifies to
− pk log(p(1− ν)) + pk(1− ν)k log p+ log(1− ν) < 0.
(8)
At k = 0, the left hand side of (8) is equal to 0. The deriva-
tive of the left hand side is equal to −pk log p log(p(1 −
ν)) + pk(1 − ν)k log p log(p(1 − ν)) < 0. Hence, the left
hand is decreasing in k and its value is less than 0 for all
k > 0.
Using the result of Lemma 3, the right hand side of (6)
is less than or equal to
max
k≥1
1− (p(1− ν))k
1− (1− ν)k
∞∑
k=1
P{EC(Ai) = k} νp
1− p(1− ν)
=ppi0. (9)
Then, from (1), (9) and (5),
P (Xi = 0)
≤ppi0 + pi1
∞∑
k=1
pkP{Y = k|EC(Ai) =∞}
≤ppi0 + pi1 νp
1− p(1− ν) . (10)
To have Re = R0P (Xi = 1) < 1, we need P (Xi = 0) >
1− 1/R0 = 1− , which implies
ppi0 + pi1
νp
1− p(1− ν) > 1− . (11)
The inequality (11) can be rewritten as follows, involving a
quadratic function of p.
pi0(1− ν)p2 − (pi0 + pi1ν + (1− )(1− ν))p+ (1− ) < 0.
(12)
The value of the quadratic function at p = 1 is equal to
−ν < 0. Therefore, one of the solutions of the quadratic
function is greater than 1 and the other is less than 1. The
latter solution will be denoted by p. Then, (11) holds if
p < p ≤ 1. We can compute p using the standard expression
for solving a quadratic equation, which gives
p =
1
2pi0(1− ν)
(
pi0 + pi1ν + (1− )(1− ν)
−
√
(pi0 + pi1ν + (1− )(1− ν))2 − 4pi0(1− ν)(1− )
)
.
(13)
The condition p > p is necessary for having Re < 1.
Therefore, p is a lower bound for the minimum required
adoption rate, i.e., p∗ ≥ p.
2) Upper Bound: We will start with (6). Using the result
of Lemma 3, for any k ≥ 1, 1−(p(1−ν))k
1−(1−ν)k is greater than or
equal to the limiting value, which is equal to 1, as k →∞.
Therefore, the right hand side of (6) is greater than or equal
to
∞∑
k=1
P{EC(Ai) = k} νp
1− p(1− ν) = pi0
νp
1− p(1− ν) .
(14)
Then, from (1), (5) and (14),
P (Xi = 0) ≥ νp
1− p(1− ν) . (15)
For any p value that satisfies νp1−p(1−ν) > 1 − , we have
Re < 1. This gives
p > p¯ , 1
1− ν + 11−ν
=
1
1 + 1−ν
. (16)
Note that p¯ defined in (16) is the po for Theorem 1 and it is
always less than 1. We see that p¯ is an upper bound of the
minimum required adoption rate in order to achieve Re < 1,
i.e., p∗ ≤ p¯.
3) Numerical Results: For the numerical results, we as-
sume the number of direct infections by an arbitrary patient,
i.e., the random variable N in Section III-B, follows a
Poisson distribution with mean R0. Table III shows sample
values for the lower and upper bounds computed based on
(13) and (16), respectively. We see that the two bounds are
very close under the chosen set of parameters. Therefore,
we have a pair of very good estimates for the true value of
the minimum required adoption rate p∗.
Remark. The Poisson assumption is not required to derive
the general expressions for p and p¯ in (13) and (16),
respectively. For the numerical results, we need to calculate
the values of pi0 and pi1 used in the expression for p,
and the Poisson assumption is needed for such calculation.
Since the expression for p¯ does contain pi0 and pi1, the
numerical values for p¯ are also the upper bound for general
distributions. Therefore, even when we do not know the
distribution for the number of direct infections, p¯ can still
be used to provide a useful upper bound.
The set of parameters used to generate the numerical
results is relevant to COVID-19. Table III shows the cases
for R0 = 3, 4, 5 and 6. These values should be enough to
cover the range of estimates for the true R0 of COVID-
19. For COVID-19, if 50% of the infected individuals are
asymptomatic and 10% of the symptomatic patients develop
severe conditions, then, on average, one out of a cluster of 20
patients has severe symptoms, which can be picked up and
tested by the medical system. In that case, ν can be taken
as 0.05. Table III also shows the result for ν = 0.02, which
is relevant if the true asymptomatic cases are drastically
more than the current estimate or if the medical system is
overly relaxed and not picking up infection cases frequently
enough. The result for ν = 0.1 shows the benefits if the
disease surveillance system can pick up patients with mild
symptoms quickly, for instance, by widespread temperature
measurement. The required adoption rate can be lowered
to the more manageable 95% range. To pursue the benefit
further, in Fig. 2, we plot the upper bound p¯ against a
wider range of ν. It shows that, if we are lucky enough
that the true R0 is around 3 and if we are vigilant enough
to catch infection cases early, the required adoption rate can
be brought to the 90% range.
We next explain why the required adoption rate is usually
high. Take the example of ν = 0.05, which corresponds to
the case where, on average, there is one patient with severe
Table III
NUMERICAL RESULTS FOR THE LOWER AND UPPER BOUNDS
ν  (R0) Lower Bound p Upper Bound p¯
0.1 1/3 (3) 0.94865 0.95238
1/4 (4) 0.96701 0.96774
1/5 (5) 0.97543 0.97561
1/6 (6) 0.98034 0.98039
0.05 1/3 (3) 0.97347 0.97561
1/4 (4) 0.98320 0.98361
1/5 (5) 0.98755 0.98765
1/6 (6) 0.99007 0.99010
0.02 1/3 (3) 0.98917 0.99010
1/4 (4) 0.99320 0.99338
1/5 (5) 0.99498 0.99502
1/6 (6) 0.99600 0.99602
Figure 2. The upper bound p¯ versus ν. The four curves correspond R0 =
3, 4, 5 and 6, respectively, in the bottom-to-top order.
symptoms in a cluster of 20 infected cases. One expects that
the cluster size has to grow to about 20 individuals before a
severe case shows up with a reasonable chance. To have a
high chance to observe a severe case, the cluster size needs
to be larger than the average number of 20, such as 40.
Once a severe case is found, we want to be able to trace the
entire cluster with a high enough probability. For instance,
at a probability of 0.75, which is needed when R0 = 4, the
required p for p40 > 0.75 is 0.993.
D. What happens if the adoption rate is less than p∗?
It is important to emphasize that when the adoption rate
p is sufficiently high, i.e., p > p∗, the effective infection
ratio Re is less than 1. Even without any additional disease
mitigation measures (other than testing and quarantine) such
as social distancing, the spread of the disease will eventually
be stopped and the number of infection cases will go down
to zero or be maintained at the near-zero level indefinitely.
In that sense, the society can truly return to normal.
When the adoption rate is less than p∗, the disease will
be able to spread exponentially in the absence of additional
measures. However, the proposed tracing strategy will still
be useful even at a moderate adoption level. It solves some
of the problems encountered in manual tracing, by making
some part of the tracing more automatic, more timely, and
less labor intensive. The higher the adoption rate of contact
recorders, the less effort is needed in manual tracing. With
the help of contact recorders, it is still possible to bring
the disease under control, i.e., to achieve Re < 1; but other
measures such as social distancing need to be retained as part
of the solution. Nevertheless, it is hopeful that the device-
based tracing can help so much that other measures can be
reduced in intensity or frequency of application. The society
can return to partial normalcy instead of full normalcy.
IV. INTERIM AND LONG-TERM SOLUTIONS
A. Some Features That the Contact Recorder Should Have
It is not automatic that the contact recorder should be
implemented as a phone app. We will first go over a list
of requirements or desirable features such a device should
have.
• The device should record the contacted ID, the starting
time of that contact, the duration of the contact, and
the distance of the contact. It only needs to be able
to measure distance within a short range, i.e., under
several meters.
• Although the device mainly relies on a kind of proxim-
ity sensor for short-range contact detection and distance
measurement, it should also have the GPS capability
to record GPS trajectories. Although the GPS data is
not useful for detecting short-range contact, it is useful
in many other ways. For instance, with the help of
mapping information, the server can deduce whether a
contact occurs in a building, and whether the building
is crowded at that time. If the contact occurs in a
crowded building, there may be other means of virus
transmissions besides person-to-person contact, such
as touching shared surfaces. A decision can be made
whether to send warning or quarantine directives more
broadly, or to seal off the building.
• The device should be able to communicate with the
central server in real time. In particular, the contact
information should be available to the server in real
time so that the server can conduct sophisticated tracing
and do so as broadly as needed.
• The communication should be two-way so that the
device is able to receive information or download data
from the server.
• The device should be inexpensive, small, light and
energy efficient so that it is not too much of a burden
to acquire, wear and maintain it.
• Preferably, the device is able to monitor body temper-
ature and other vital signs.
• The device and the whole system should have necessary
security and privacy-protection mechanisms.
• The software of the device should be upgradable auto-
matically.
B. Interim Solution: Mobile Phones as Contact Recorders
Most of the newer phones are equipped with Bluetooth
Low Energy (BLE), which allows them to sense the presence
of each other when they come into contact, which is a form
of proximity sensing. Such phones satisfy most of the re-
quirements listed earlier. However, one of the main problems
is that their distance measurement is not accurate because
the distance is estimated solely based on RSSI (received
signal strength indicator). As an example, in the current
implementation of iOS’s iBeacon, the sensed distance is
categorized into immediate (i.e., the two phones are pretty
much next to each other), near (maybe up to a few meters),
and far (anything above near). To act as contact recorders,
immediate and near are close to the intended sensing range.
If two phones fall into the immediate range, it is almost
certainly the case that the two individuals are in close
contact. If they fall in the near range, the individuals may be
under a meter to a few meters apart. They may or may not
be in the infection range. In those cases, timing information
such as the duration of contact can be combined with the
distance information when the server assesses the risk of
infection. For instance, if the contact lasted 30 minutes in the
near range, then the risk of infection may be considered high.
Overall, the contact-tracing strategy can still be effective if
the inaccuracy in distance measurement is compensated by
more aggressive risk evaluation, testing, and quarantine.
The phone-based system has many advantages. On the
phone side, the system is easy and quick to deploy as
people only need to download and activate a phone app.
The app is relatively easy to program, when compared with
building a new system from scratch. It is relatively easy
to add sophisticated features, including strong security and
privacy protection. The app is readily upgradable so that the
capabilities of the system can be gradually improved. It costs
nothing for people who already have a phone with the right
generation of Bluetooth technologies. The phone app can
communicate in real time with a central server or servers
run by either an authority or a private company on behalf of
the authority. Data collection, analysis and decision-making
can be done in real time.
C. Enhancement: Adding Fixed-Location Beacons
The direct mobile-to-mobile contact detection can be
supplemented by beacon-to-mobile communication for lo-
calization. The BLE-based beacons are one of the upcoming
technologies used in proximity-sensing systems, because
they interact with mobile phones very well. In fact, the same
technology can be used for a mobile phone to detect either
another mobile phone or a beacon. In addition, these beacons
are inexpensive, small, easy to deploy, and they can last up to
several years with a single battery (for instance, see products
of Estimote [9]). Their main function is to broadcast beacon
signals periodically, e.g., once every second. A smart phone
can detect the beacon signal when it comes into a sufficiently
close range.
Beacons can be installed widely in major public venues,
especially in closed spaces such as different parts of a
conference hall or a theater, different subway cars, or buses.
Once a mobile phone detects a nearby beacon, it records
the beacon ID and time of encounter. In the backend,
the server has information on where exactly that beacon
is located. When a patient is discovered, the beacon IDs
recorded on his/her phone can be used to determine the
places that the patient has been to and the time of the
visits. For instance, with beacons installed on subway trains,
it is possible to identify which car of a subway train the
patient has traveled on. The subway car may be disinfected
if needed. Moreover, if the virus can be transmitted over a
longer distance in aerosols or in droplets carried by air flows
from air conditioner systems, which is likely the case for the
coronavirus, people who are in the same closed space but
not within the close-range contact distance are also at risk.
Such beacon-based tracing can be used to discover those
individuals.
The beacon-based scheme is similar to the QR-code-
based scheme used in countries such as China and South
Korea. When entering a public place such as a building
or a bus, each individual uses a phone app to scan a
QR code displayed at that location. This way, the backend
server knows who entered the place at different time. If an
individual is later confirmed to be infected, the server is
able to identify all the people who were together with the
infected individual at a location. Although the QR codes are
easier to deploy, the beacon-based scheme has the advantage
that the phones automatically scan beacon signals. Manual
scanning of QR codes can become tiresome if an individual
has to scan many times a day at different places. Without
service personnel stationed at each QR-code location, people
may eventually skip scanning the code. The beacon-based
scheme is far more scalable, making it possible to cover the
public space finely.
D. Longer-Term Solutions
Even after the current crisis, other pandemics will strike
again. Vaccine development, effective treatment and even
testing will always be lagging for a new infectious dis-
ease. However, quarantine and contact tracing are infection-
control measures that can be applied immediately. The
mobile device and the tracing strategy outlined here may
become part of the public health measures to combat future
pandemics. At any moment, the society should have a ver-
sion of the mobile device and a concrete tracing strategy that
are readily deployable. Meanwhile and when time allows,
the design of the mobile device can be continuously refined.
In particular, there is a need to improve the accuracy of
distance sensing, down to centimeter range, possibly by
using different families of sensors or with the help of lo-
calization techniques such as triangulation. The inclusion of
more biosensors can be very useful for disease surveillance
and patient monitoring.
In the long run, the mobile device may or may not be
part of a mobile phone. It could be a standalone device that
communicates with a phone app, or it could be a completely
independent device communicating with the central server
directly via cellular networks. A standalone device has some
advantages over the phones. It can be made smaller, and
therefore, more wearable, like a watch, a name card or
a pin. It may be simpler to use so that people who are
unfamiliar with smart phone operations can participate. It
may be cheaper than a phone. All these properties make
them suitable for children of young ages. A standalone
device can also be more visible when a person wears it. Such
visibility is important for the intended use. In all likelihood,
standalone devices may coexist with phone-based devices.
E. Security and Privacy
Security and privacy experts have quickly entered the
conversations about proximity-based tracing through phone
apps, and they are offering their thoughts and preliminary
solutions for data security and privacy preservation [10]–
[13]. Privacy preservation is also central in the proposed
APIs by Apple and Google to support contact-tracing apps
[2]. In this paper, we will not review the details of what have
been considered, but refer the readers to the relevant writ-
ings. We would like to emphasize that privacy preservation
depends on the assumed operations of the tracing system.
For instance, the APIs of Apple and Google address how
to preserve anonymity between the two parties of a contact,
and how to ensure consent before contact data is uploaded to
the server. Simply put, the privacy and security features will
depend on what data different components of the system
collects, the movement of the data, and how the data are
used. In light of the stated goal of this paper, we envision a
system with maximum liberty in data collection and use. The
server at any time should have all the needed information
to trace and identify a cluster of contacts, and know how to
reach them for testing. The questions are, under that setting,
to what extent privacy can be preserved and how.
Although the details are complex, some basic principles
seem to be uncontroversial. The authority must promise
that the collected contact information will only be used for
infectious disease control. It will not be used in any way that
leads to any harm to the individuals. The data will be deleted
or anonymized after they are no longer useful for disease
control, e.g., after several weeks to several months.4 The
data must be secure against theft through proper encryption.
How to enforce these principles is both a technological issue
and a legal issue.
For individuals who are not comfortable with having their
contact information kept on the server for any amount of
4For instance, in Singapore’s TraceTogether, the contact information of
an infected individual is uploaded to the government server only after
consent, is encrypted and kept for up to 21 days.
time or in any form, the system can still be useful while
guaranteeing full protection of privacy. For instance, the
server can store non-identifiable information of consenting
patients, e.g., hashed values of their device IDs. The indi-
viduals who do not wish to upload their contact information
can download the infection information from the server
and check whether they have been in contact with any
infected person. The APIs by Apple and Google highlight
this particular approach. However, in order to bring the
reproduction ratio below 1, such individuals must constitute
a very small fraction of the population.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
This paper presents a best-case scenario about what
proximity-sensing-based contact tracing can accomplish. It
can achieve way more than what casual thinking may
suggest; but the requirement is a high adoption rate. In
particular, with a high enough adoption rate, there is likely
no need for social distancing. One of our main purposes is
to raise the aspiration level when applying such a method of
tracing. All relevant parties of the society should put more
effort into adopting the method and reaching a high adoption
rate.
Although advocating for universal adoption may seem
drastic and the target may seem difficult to reach, upon some
thinking, the situation is not so different from other universal
public-health measures, such as vaccination or mask-wearing
in public. The latter has already happened in some cities and
countries in the West. It is likely that universal adoption, or
at least encouragement of doing so, can happen in some
cities, states or even countries.
It is possible that the minimum required adoption rate
can be lower than what is reported in this paper. If so, that
could mean the tracing strategy can be fully effective at a
more easily achievable adoption rate. The readers are invited
to find opportunity to lower the bound. One likely place to
look into is whether the definition of Re is the most relevant.
Given the main theme of the paper, we would like
to suggest privacy and security experts work more under
the assumptions of universal adoption, real-time upload of
contact information and automated detection of infection
clusters. For tracing clusters of infections as quickly as
possible, it will not work well if the contact information of
some individuals stays on their phones and is uploaded only
after consent. The aim should be to develop mechanisms
for ensuring privacy under these new assumptions and for
ensuring that the system is used only for the intended
purpose and intended time frame (21 days of user data
retention, etc.).
Although the contact recorders help to solve very dif-
ficult problems and save a great deal of effort in contact
tracing, success also depends on other potentially costly
operations. In particular, the total number of contacts made
by an infection cluster is likely many times more than
the contacts that lead to actual infections. Testing must
be able to keep up with the large number of contacts in
order to correctly identify actual infections. Good quarantine
operation is another costly component. Furthermore, to be
able to detect infection clusters before they become too
large, disease surveillance needs to be strengthened, for
instance, by widespread temperature checking. To cope with
the cost, much can be done to improve the tracing system as
operational experiences accumulate. For instance, the system
should adapt and learn to become more accurate in assessing
infection risk, such as what sort of contacts are more likely
to lead to infection, so as to reduce the number of tests
needed.
In practice, there are various constraints and concerns
that may limit the adoption rate to be below the minimum
required rate. Even so, the device-based tracing approach
will still be very useful. In situations where it is applicable,
it is a great improvement over manual tracing. Depending
on the actual adoption rate, we may not be able to end
social distancing, but we may be able to greatly relax it. It is
possible that a combination of device-based tracing, manual
tracing, and some mild-form social distancing together can
bring back much normalcy. As an evidence, even without
device-based tracing, some Asian regions appear to have
brought the reproduction ratio very close to 1 with intensive
manual tracing, strong disease surveillance, and mild social-
distancing measures. If device-based tracing is adopted, it
will not only save much of the effort of manual tracing,
but it may be able to bring the reproduction ratio decisively
below 1 and further reduce the need for social distancing.
The conjecture remains to be proven. Simulation studies can
provide some early indication.
Throughout, we have mostly considered disease spreading
through person-to-person direct contact. COVID-19 can also
spread through other means. In Section IV-C, we discussed
using beacons to deal with spread over longer distance in
closed space, such as some form of airborne transmissions
in restaurants or conference halls. The tracing for those
situations works similarly as that for close-distance human
contacts, except that the number of individuals that need to
be screened is likely much larger. There are also transmis-
sions through shared surfaces, such as shared coffee tables
or elevator buttons. The beacon approach can also be useful
for some of those situations to pinpoint the locations of
transmissions. There will be situations where none of the
device-based approaches can catch the origin of infection.
In our framework, we could view each of such occasions
as the start of a cluster. The first patient of the cluster will
later be identified through tracing after transmissions through
person-to-person contact begin. In the end, it is still the
person-to-person direct transmissions that are of the primary
concern, because both sides of each transmission are mobile.
Furthermore, if transmissions of this type can be dealt with
effectively, fewer people will be infected and less of the
shared environment will be contaminated.
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